




















     Under present financial accounting standards, in Japan and in U.S., firms can choose 
pension discount rates, which they use for earnings measurement, at their discretion.  First, 
this paper investigates, what factors affect their choice of pension discount rates.    The sample 
firms in this paper reduced their discount rates, when market interest rate declined in 1990s, 
more slowly than the tendency in the market.  We analyze the causes of this delay by logit 
model.  Regression results show that, given declining interest rate, the significant factor 
affecting the firms’ choice is not leverage, but profitability (return on equity: ROE).    Second, 
this research investigates empirically how stock prices reflect the size of pension discount rate.   
Both unamortized pension obligations and pension expenses in the year are positively 
associated with stock prices.    However, the coefficients for the firms, whose discount rates are 
higher than median, are smaller than those for the firms choosing lower rates.  Those 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero.  These results indicate that the firms, 
which chose lower pension discount rates, are valued higher.  This asymmetric result is 
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1.  Introduction 
     The accounting standard for a defined benefits pension plan was revised in Japan in 
1998.  By this revision, pension expenses will be measured by the method like as U.S. 
standard (SFAS No.87).    The pension expenses in the year consists of two components.    One 
is the allocated amount to each period, discounting future pension benefits by the discount rate 
that a firm chooses.    Another is operating profits (and losses) from pension assets, and this is 
deducted from pension expenses.  The actuarial method, which uses discount calculation in 
allocating future benefits to each fiscal year, is drawn neither deductively nor consistently from 
the existing body of accounting standards.    Moreover, there is not theoretical necessity that it 
should be specified so.  Although a slight difference in discount rate would change 
dramatically pension expenses and pension liabilities on the balance sheet, the accounting 
standard vaguely specifies the discount rate.  That is, a firm can choose a discount rate 
arbitrarily, referring to the interest rate of a long-term government bond or a long-term superior 
corporate bond.  At this point, there is no essential difference between the Japanese and the 
U.S. accounting standards. 
     Since discounting is neither intuitive nor natural, and not conceptually obvious, we 
cannot determine the pension discount rate uniquely.  Nevertheless, firms can discretionally 
choose their pension discount rates.    Under this condition, what criterion will firms base on in 
choosing discount rates?  It is the first subject in this paper.  Of course, even if firms chose 
pension discount rates for the purpose of earnings management, investors would not be 
misleaded systematically.  If the capital market is efficient and investors are sophisticated, as 
far as pension discount rates are disclosed and the motives of earnings management are 
publicly known, investors could see through the manipulated numbers and evaluate the firms, 
assuming the possibility of earnings management.  Then, the second and main subject in this 
paper is to confirm how firms’ choice of pension discount rates is evaluated in the capital 
market.    We investigate the relation between the size of pension discount rate and stock prices 
based on a fundamental-link model. 
     The sample in this study consists of 24 Japanese companies, which prepare the 
consolidated financial statements based on SEC rule and disclose them in Japan.    The sample 
period starts in the 1990 fiscal year when the application of SFAS No.87 started, and ends in the 
1998 fiscal year (March, 1999).  Since the size of sample is quite small, this empirical 
analysis may have serious restrictions.  However, even in the U.S., only a few studies are 
directing its attention to the choice of pension discount rate, or its evaluation in the capital 
market.  Therefore, even if the size of sample is small, the importance of analyzing for 
Japanese companies is by no means small.          Page  2   
          This paper investigated, first, what factors affected their choice of pension discount rates.   
The sample firms reduced their discount rates, when market interest rate declined in 1990s, 
more slowly than the tendency in the market.  We analyzed the causes of this delay by logit 
model.  Regression results show that, given declining interest rate, the significant factor 
affecting the firms’ choice was not leverage, but profitability (return on equity: ROE).  
Second, this research investigated empirically how stock prices reflect the size of pension 
discount rate.  Both unamortized pension obligations and pension expenses in the year are 
positively associated with stock prices.  However, the coefficients for the firms, whose 
discount rates are higher than median, are smaller than those for the firms choosing the lower 
rates.  Those coefficients are not significantly different from zero.  These results indicate 
that the firms, which chose lower pension discount rates, are valued higher.    This asymmetric 
result is consistent with the first point in this paper, concerning the firms’ motives for pension 
discount rate choice. 
          This paper is organized as follows.    Section 2 describes current conditions in respect of 
discount rates in pension accounting and reviews related accounting literature to provide a 
context for our study and a basis for the empirical model we test.  Section 3 analyzes the 
motives to choose a pension discount rate, using logit model.  In Sections 4 and 5, we 
investigate how stock prices reflect the discount rate by OLS regression.  In Section 4, the 
book value of equity model is examined.    On the other hand, in Section 5, the earnings model 
is examined.  Section 6 investigates the robustness of regression results in foregoing two 
Sections.    Conclusions follow in Section 7. 
 
2.    Current Conditions and Prior Studies 
2.1    U.S. SITUATIONS AND SITUATION IN JAPAN 
          The pension accounting standard prescribes that firms can choose pension discount rates 
with referring to a market interest rate.  As for the reference rate, however, the accounting 
standard  SFAS No. 87 only illustrates two or more examples: a government bond rate, a 
superior corporate bond rate, and an official announcement rate of Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC).  In choosing pension discount rates, some discretion is given to firms.  
According to AICPA’s investigation, there is remarkable variation in discount rate among 
companies as shown in Panel A of Table 1.  Although the range decreased in 1994 and 
afterwards, there will still be a difference by 2.5% between highest and lowest in 1996.  Of 
course, if the kinds of market interest rate referred to differ, it is natural that discount rates 
differ, but the range of variation is not the question here. 
     In this period, what level were the market interest rates that the accounting standard          Page  3   
illustrates?  CM10 in Panel B of Table 1 denotes the yield of the government bond for ten 
years, and CM30 is the yield of the government bond for 30 years.    AAA denotes the yield of 
corporate bond of AAA rank by Moody's and AUTL is the yield of the public utility bond of A 
rank.  Rate 1 in Panel C is the PBGC rate which calculates VBO (vested benefit obligations) 
of the pension plan, and Rate 2 is the liquidation rate by PBGC.    When a firm stops a pension 
program and hands over pension obligations and pension assets to PBGC, Rate 2 said here will 
be used for calculation of pension obligations.  Besides, the information on Rate 1 before 
1987 has not come to hand. 
     At the time the interest rate declined in 1993, the pension discount rates were also 
reduced in response to it as presented in Panels A, B and C.  It seems that, however, pension 
discount rates were downward rigid a little, and the reduction width in discount rate was 
smaller whereas various kinds of interest rates declined sharply.    Although the same tendency 
as above was observed also in 1996, it is noticeable that the trend of liquidation rate of PBGC 
has deviated from the trend of bond interests.  While the yield of the U.S. government bond 
declined 0.5% or more and reached 6% in 1996, the liquidation rate of PBGC rose 1.5% 
reversely in the meantime, and reached 8% in 1996.  Thus, when the interest rate in bond 
market declined, neither cases where a firm did not reduce the pension discount rate, nor cases 
where a firm pulled up it on the contrary were against the accounting standard.    The situation, 
which did not agree with common sense, has arisen. 
          On the other hand, how was the situation of Japanese firms?    Table 2 is the situations of 
those companies prepare the consolidated financial statements based on U.S. SEC rules, and 
end fiscal year at March 31.  In Japan, a contracted interest rate in pension plan has been 
fixed to 5.5% for many years by law.    Although in financial accounting a firm can choose the 
different discount rate form the contracted rate, many firms have chosen 5.5% as a discount 
rate at the application start time of SFAS No.87.    GBI in Table 2 is the yield of the government 
bond for ten years, and all numbers are results at the end of March (source from Bank of 
Japan).  In Japan, since there is very little reliable data on a long-term interest rate, we will 
compare this yield with pension discount rates.  The firms were reluctant to reduce discount 
rates, although a market interest rate declined in this period.    After a long-term interest rate in 
the market declined considerably, the firms have reduced their discount rates at last. 
     Table 2 provides the evidence that, even as the interest rate declined, many firms 
hesitated to reduce discount rates.  At this point, there is no essential difference between 
Japan and U.S.   Since the present condition became clear, we need to examine why firms are 
unwilling to reduce discount rates.  That is, the motive of a firm is the question.  
Furthermore, we need to examine how sock prices reflect the size of pension discount rate.           Page  4   
The purpose of this study is to examine above two subjects. 
 
2.2  PRIOR  STUDIES 
     In the earlier empirical study, analysis has been concentrated on the issue whether 
pension obligations on actuarial basis are the same obligations as usual (legal) ones, the issued 
corporate bond or the borrowing from bank, etc.    For example, Martin and Henderson [1983], 
Maher [1987], Reiter [1991, 1992], and Maher and Ketz [1993] investigated the valuation of 
pension obligations in corporate bond market by analyzing bond ratings or bond premiums.  
Moreover, the influence that underfoundings (unfounded pension obligations) had on firm 
value has been also research subject.    Feldstein and Seligman [1981], Livnat [1984], Dhaliwal 
[1986], Landsman [1986], Bulow, Mφ rck and Summers [1987], Kemp [1987], Gopalakrishnan 
and Sugrue [1990, 1992, 1993, 1995], and Barth [1991] analyzed the valuation of pension 
obligations on actuarial basis or the valuation of pension liabilities on accounting basis in the 
stock market.  Furthermore, Barth, Beaver and Landsman [1992] investigated the relation 
between pension expenses and stock prices. 
          Among the studies analyzing the influence that pension obligations have on stock prices, 
there are a few studies that directed its attention especially to the variation in pension discount 
rate; Feldstein and Mφ rck [1983], Ippolito [1986], Reiter [1991], Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue 
[1990, 1992], and Kwon [1994].  In those studies, the “constructive pension obligations,” 
which could be computed by using the average actuarial assumptions, was chosen as an 
independent variable.  Those studies investigated whether investors would adjust the pension 
liability information on accounting basis in such a manner for firm valuation.    However, why 
should investors use such a unique method?    The adjusting method is not supported in theory 
yet.
1 
     On the other hand, research on selection of accounting policy --- so-called positive 
accounting theory --- is another main research domain.  By analyzing managers’ interests 
prescribed by the contracts, the motives for accounting policy choice and their changes have 
been investigated in various phases.  The debt covenants hypothesis, the managerial 
compensation hypothesis, and the regulation evasion hypothesis are the well-known behavioral 
hypotheses.  Although there are not so many empirical studies focusing on the motives 
underlying pension discount rate choice, the following studies belong to the school of those 
research series.   Ghicas [1990], Kwon [1994], and Godwin, Goldberg and Duchac [1996] are 
                                                   
1      Francis and Reiter [1987] investigated the motive of pension founding policy by regression analysis that chose, 
as a dependent variable, the pension obligations standardized by the official announcement rate of PBGC.  The 
problem remains on the choice of a dependent variable.    And Thomas [1988] includes the same problem.          Page  5   
as such studies.    In addition, Amir and Gordon [1996] analyzed the discount rate in measuring 
post retirement benefits other than pensions.
2 
     In Ghicas [1990], the motives to change the calculation method of pension expenses, 
before  SFAS No.87 era, was analyzed by logit model.  According to Ghicas [1990], the 
tendency was observed, that the firms whose profitability got worse changed the calculation 
method into the new one, which would cut down pension expenses, and chose higher pension 
discount rates and made pension obligations smaller nominally.  However, many of 
independent variables in his research are the results (ex post) brought by changes in pension 
discount rate.   The conditions (ex ante) at the time of decision-making whether to change are 
not chosen as independent variables.  Therefore, in exploring the motives for changes in 
discount rate, his model has a miss-specification. 
     Kwon [1994] chose the discount rates the dependent variable, and analyzed the motives 
for discount rate choice by OLS regression.    Independent variables are the size of total assets, 
the debt to equity ratio, the interest coverage ratio, the manager's stock holding ratio, and the 
founding ratio.  After SFAS No.87 era, the debt to equity ratio and the founding ratio were 
statistically significant.  However, this research did not choose a market interest rate the 
independent variable, thus other conditions could not be sufficiently controlled.  Since firms 
are obliged to choose pension discount rates with referring to a market interest rate by the 
accounting standard, a market interest rate should be chosen as an independent variable as a 
control factor in empirical study.    Moreover, in Kwon [1994] it is ambiguous whether interest 
coverage ratio is a proxy for profitability or for financial condition.  As a result, his 
conclusion is not clear. 
     On the other hand, Godwin, Goldberg and Duchac [1996] (GGD hereafter) chose six 
variables as the independent variables: the changes in market interest rate, the rate of return, 
the financial margin of funds for dividends, cash flows, the debt to equity ratio, the existence 
of corporate tax payments.    The fact that the discount rate was not changed and the magnitude 
of the effect on earnings by the changes in discount rate were transformed into an order 
measure, and it was chosen as the dependent variable of Ordered Logit Regression.  They 
reported that the rate of return, the financial margin of funds for dividends, the debt to equity 
                                                   
2   Francis [1987] analyzed the characteristics of the firms that lobbied against the proposal of new pension 
accounting standard in 1982.  Stone and Ingram [1988], Sami and Lipka [1989], Senteney and Strawser [1990], 
Scott [1991], Ali and Kumar [1993, 1994], Brozovsky, Murray and Selto [1993], Harper and Strawser [1993], 
Langer and Lev [1993], and Espahbodi and Hamer [1996] analyzed the relation between the starting year of 
application of SFAS No.87 and the firm characteristics.  The case where the firms can choose the application 
starting time of a new accounting standard is the situation that flexibility is high, in the meaning that past selection 
is not restrained, compared with the case where the firm would change the once adopted discount rate.    Therefore, 
it is a suitable material to investigate the incentives of the firm.  Besides, there are studies treating the change of 
actuarial assumptions, for example, Morris and Nichols [1984], Rollins [1993], and Blankley and Swanson [1995].          Page  6   
ratio, and the existence of corporate tax payments were significant.  Although the official 
announcement rate of PBGC was chosen as a market interest rate, it is reported that changes in 
interest rate was not significant statistically.  However, the market interest rates, such as a 
government bond yield, are not included in independent variables.  Therefore, this research 
does not necessarily show whether firms had completely ignored the market interest rate 
movement when they chose pension discount rates. 
          The independent variables, which GGD chose, consisted of not only what was given (ex 
ante) in choosing a discount rate, but also the variable realized as a result (ex post).  The 
problem exists in the choice of independent variables.  Moreover, the dependent variable 
GGD chose was, not the discount rates, but the effect brought by the choice of discount rate.  
Therefore, GGD has not clarified the motives to choose the discount rate.    In order to analyze 
the motives, we need to choose the firms’ choice itself the dependent variable and choose the 
variables, which firms would face and took into consideration in choosing discount rates, as 
the independent variables.    We will pay careful attention to this point in Section 3. 
     Amir and Gordon [1996] (AG hereafter), although it is treating post retirement benefits 
other than pensions (SFAS No.106), analyzed the motives to choose two factors, the increasing 
rate of benefits and the discount rate.  AG applied OLS regression, transforming the 
combination of two factors into the standardized present value of obligations, and chose this 
present value the dependent variable.  In their result, only the debt to equity ratio was 
significant.  However, there is no theoretical conclusive method for standardizing pension 
obligations.  Moreover, the nominal measure, which the combinations of firm size (total 
amount of market value of equity) and price-earnings ratio (PER) were transformed into, was 
chosen as the independent variable.  The experiential meaning of this variable is very 
questionable.    Consequently, in AG, it is not clear what hypothesis they assumed. 
     Furthermore, in AG, the “constructive benefit obligations” of each firm was computed 
by the median of increasing rate of benefits and the median of discount rates in the sample.  
Using stock prices as the dependent variable and using the estimated constructive obligations 
as an independent variable, AG analyzed whether investors would correct and value the 
reported benefit obligations.  However, the meaningful result was not obtained.  Two issues 
are included in this kind of research.  The first issue on the correction method was explained 
earlier.  The second issue is the stock valuation model.  The causal relation between the 
amount of benefits and stock prices was not sufficiently discussed in AG. 
          In this paper, we emphasize and reconfirm the traditional paradigm in accounting theory: 
earnings information in financial accounting would be used for the prediction of future cash 
flows by investors, and investors would translate it into the present value using the cost of          Page  7   
capital and then use it for firm valuation.  Considering this paradigm, in this paper, we will 
build a simple model and use it consistently as a framework.    Based on it, this paper examines 
how investors value the pension discount rates chosen by firms.  This paper focuses 
especially on the foundation of stock valuation model, i.e. the theoretical relation (fundamental 
-link) between accounting information and stock prices.    Unlike precedence studies, we place 
heavy weight on fundamentals in this paper, and pay careful attention to transposing the 
theoretical relation to a linear regression model.  It is expected by doing so that a more 
precious result will be obtained rather than choosing the assets and liabilities on the balance 
sheet as independent variables arbitrarily. 
 
3.    Motives for Pension Discount Rate Choice 
3.1  SAMPLES  AND  DATA 
     A firm can choose a pension discount rate, used when calculating pension obligations 
(projected benefit obligations: PBO) and pension expenses, at the firm’s discretion, as already 
mentioned.  This paper does not investigate how the level of a discount rate is decided, but 
what criterion firms base on when they change their discount rates.  Sample consists of 24 
Japanese companies, which are preparing the consolidated financial statements with the 
application of SEC standards in Japan.  They adopted SFAS No.87 from 1990.
3  T h e  f i r m s  
that did not disclose pension discount rates continuously were eliminated.  In addition, the 
first application year of SFAS No.87, and the irregular fiscal year in which the accounting 
period was changed were eliminated.  Finally, the total sample is 199 firm-years from 
February 1990 to March 1999.    We will test this sample throughout this paper. 
     All accounting data was hand-collected from the financial statements in legal form 
(YOUKASHOUKEN-HOUKOKUSYO-SOURAN), and pension-related data was taken out 
from the footnotes in financial statements.    Since the amount of pension expenses in the year 
is not clear in the main part of financial statements, it is assumed that the disclosed amount in 
footnote would be the pension expenses in the year.   
 
3.2    EFFECTS BY REDUCTION OF DISCOUNT RATE 
     A firm would choose a pension discount rate, after considering the effect on accounting 
numbers.    In general, a firm compares the situation where the discount rate would be changed 
and the situation not changed, and will choose the more favorable one.    If so, the question on 
the motives for discount rate choice would be explained only after clarifying the anticipated 
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unfavorable influences.  Since the observable phenomena actually are the results and the 
effects that the firm permitted, it is difficult to guess, from the realized accounting numbers, 
the anticipated unfavorable influences that were avoided in fact.  However, it will be still 
useful to confirm the effects ex post by the reduction of discount rate, before solving the 
motives. 
     In this paper, we compared the various kinds of fundamental financial ratios from two 
angles.  One is the comparison between the preceding years and the changed years of the 
firms that reduced their discount rates.  Another is the comparison, in the pooled data, 
between the firm-years that changed discount rates and the firm-years not changed.  The 
compared financial ratios are divided roughly into three groups, group I is debt concern, group 
II is earnings concern, and group III is cash flows concern.  The debt-related ratios are (1) 
long-term debt (including pension liabilities) to equity (net-assets) ratio, (2) total debt 
(including pension liabilities) to equity ratio, (3) pension liabilities to equity ratio, (4) 
off-balanced pension obligations to equity ratio.    Earnings-related ratios are (5) net income to 
equity ratio, (6) earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) to equity ratio, (7) pension expenses 
to EBIT ratio, and (8) EBIT to interest payments ratio.    Cash flows-related ratios are (9) cash 
flows form operating activities to equity in the previous year ratio, (10) cash flows form 
investing activities to equity in the previous year ratio. 
     Table 3 summarizes the results by comparative analyses.  Panel A is the results when 
comparing the financial ratios in the preceding year with those in the changed year when firms 
reduced discount rates.    The Z value in the right end column is Wilcoxon's statistics of signed 
rank sum test (p-value in parenthesis).  Only two variables, (3) pension liabilities to equity 
ratio and (4) off-balanced pension obligations to equity ratio, show the statistically significant 
change.  Although pension liabilities and pension obligations increase when the pension 
discount rates decrease, the financial condition and profitability of the firms are not getting 
worse significantly.  However, this result does not necessarily suggest that the reduction of 
discount rate generally has only small effect on accounting numbers.  Possibly the firms, 
which reduced discount rates, might have taken in advance the protective actions so that each 
ratio would not be worse. 
          Panel B is the results when comparing the firm-years that reduced discount rates with the 
firm-years not reduced.  The Z value in the right end column is the statistics of Mann- 
Whitney's U test (p-value in the parenthesis).  The cash flows (index (9)) from operating 
activities in the firm-years, which reduced discount rates, were more plentiful.   This suggests 
that the firms reduced discount rates when their profitability was good.  However, partly 
because the pension expenses increases as discount rates decrease, the good performance at the          Page  9   
time may not be appearing in earnings (index (5)). 
          On the other hand, it seems that the reduction of discount rate was unrelated to the level 
of debt to equity ratio.  Although the reduction brings a steep increase in pension obligations 
(indices (3) and (4) in Panels A and B), its effect on leverage is small (indices (1) and (2) in 
Panel A).   Moreover, it seems that there is no causal relation between the debt to equity ratio 
and the reduction of discount rate (indices (1) and (2) in Panel B).    Public media in Japan are 
reporting pessimistically, the expected situation at the start time of new pension accounting 
standard, especially the effect, which pension liabilities will have on the financial condition of 
the firm.  However, in the phase of the change of discount rate, as above-mentioned analysis 
results show, the issues on financial conditions seem to be not relevant questions.    We need to 
examine what condition firms are considering when they change their pension discount rates.  
We will proceed to this subject in the next clause. 
 
3.3  LOGIT  MODEL 
     If a firm follows the pension accounting standard mechanically, when a market interest 
rate declines, according to it, the firm should reduce the pension discount rate quickly.  
However, the kind of reference rate is not defined uniquely, thus the firm’s discretion in 
choosing the discount rate is allowed in the accounting standard.  In addition, firms should 
not necessarily refer to the interest rate of the same kind every year.
4  Therefore, it is also 
possible for a firm not to reduce the pension discount rate, even if various kinds of market 
interest rates decline, excusing that the firm has changed the reference rate to the higher one. 
     Probably, it may be a superior plan that a firm does not reduce the discount rate at 
discretion, even if a market interest rate would decline, because both pension expenses and 
pension liabilities would increase when a discount rate would decreases.    However, firms may 
reduce pension discount rates inevitably, if the difference between the market interest rate and 
the pension discount rate exceeds a certain threshold.  If a firm does not reduce the discount 
rate, only considering accounting performance even when a market interest rate declines, those 
cosmetic activities may be negatively valued and the firm value may decrease in the capital 
market.  If the market discipline would function, no firm may have unrestricted freedom in 
choosing the discount rate.   
     When analyzing the factors affecting the binary choice, the logit model is used in many 
cases.
5  Logit model analysis is the method of estimating the coefficients on a factor by the 
                                                   
4      In pension accounting standard, a firm is not obliged to disclose the kind of market interest rate that it refer. 
5   Maddala [1991], Stone and Rasp [1991], Kennedy [1992], and Barniv and McDonald [1999] explain the 
application and its controversial point of the logit model in accounting research.          Page 10   
maximum-likelihood estimation, assigning a discrete nominal measure to the choice of a firm, 
and using as a dependent variable the ratio of the probability in which each choice occurs (Log 
Odds Ratio, LR).  In this paper, the firm-years that did not reduce pension discount rates are 
set to 0 (N= 121), the firm-years that reduced discount rates 0.5% or less in a fiscal year are set 
to 1 (N= 52), and the firm-years that reduced discount rates more than 0.5% in a fiscal year are 
set to 2 (N= 26).    The reason for setting 0.5% as the boundary line is that 0.5% is the median 
and the mode of reduction width. 
     In  our  logit  analysis,  the  following  model  is  estimated: 
 
      u ity Profitabil Leverage Interest LR + + + + = 3 2 1 β β ∆ β α  (1) 
 
where  Interest ∆  is changes in market interest rate in the year.  From a definition of the 
dependent variable above-mentioned, if the declined size of market interest rate is larger and a 
firm reduces the discount rate so more greatly, then  1 β  will be negative.  In addition, if a 
firm chooses the pension discount rate only in consideration of the market interest rate 
principally, and the firm is not taking into consideration at all the effects, which changes in 
discount rate has on accounting numbers, then both  2 β  and  3 β   in equation (1) will be zero.   
Therefore, the following hypothesis can be assumed. 
 
     H 1   A firm chooses a pension discount rate only in consideration of the changes in 
market interest rate.  When the market interest rate declines, a firm reduces the 
pension discount rate according to it.      ( 0 1 < β ,  0 3 2 = = β β ) 
 
     On the other hand, in the research domain concerning the accounting policy, two 
hypotheses, which are not mutually exclusive, have been discussed and examined repeatedly.  
One hypothesis is that firms avoid the state that worsens the debt to equity ratio (leverage).  
In many cases, maintaining the debt to equity ratio imposed under debt covenants is seemed as 
an important incentive.    If the restrictive financial covenant is broken, the cost of capital will 
rise in the future.  Then, in order to make the possibility of technical default lower and to 
make the cost of capital lower, firms avoid the actions that would raise the debt to equity ratio.   
Another hypothesis is that firms act in order to increase earnings or raise the rate of return on 
equity.  As for the direct motive, the managerial compensation plan linked with accounting 
earnings has often been studied.  Moreover, maintaining the retained earnings for smoothing 
the dividends is said as an indirect motive.  Of course, existence of the restrictive financial 
covenant above-mentioned may also serve as the motive for nominal increase in earnings.          Page 11   
          However, our research does not specify the motives of firms any more.    The reason for 
adopting this research plan is that the main status was not yet given in disclosure system to the 
consolidated financial statements in this sample period.  Thus, it is not clear how the 
consolidated financial statements were used in a private contract.  Below, this study 
concentrates on presuming the motives of a firm in the dimension of accounting indices 
principally, not directly specifying the motives.  We examine in this paper whether firms has 
chosen their discount rates in consideration of either leverage or profitability.  Specifically, 
we will examine the following two hypotheses that are not mutually exclusive. 
 
     H 2a      The firm whose debt to equity ratio is relatively high does not reduce the discount 
rate, in order to avoid the much more deterioration.  Conversely, the firm whose 
debt to equity ratio is low reduces the discount rate without considering it.   
( 0 2 < β ) 
     H 2b   The firm whose profitability (return on equity; ROE) is relatively low does not 
reduce the discount rate, in order to avoid the much more deterioration.   
Conversely, the firm whose profitability is high reduces the discount rate without 
considering  it.   ( 0 3 > β ) 
 
     Besides, in order to reserve the cash that a firm can use for business and maintain the 
pension-founding ratio, when cash flows in the year are not plentiful, the firm may not reduce 
the discount rate as to control the level of pension obligations.    On the contrary, if cash flows 
are so plentiful that a firm can increase the pension contribution corresponding to the increase 
in pension obligations, the firm can reduce the pension discount rate.  To test this cash 
reservation hypothesis, it is necessary to know the amount of contribution to the pension fund 
each year.  However, before 1997, they were not disclosed.  Therefore, we cannot test this 
hypothesis in our sample period.    We concentrate on examining above three hypotheses. 
 
3.4  DEFINITION  OF  INDEPENDENT  VARIABLES 
     First issue is what kind of rate we should adopt as a market interest rate in the 
above-shown equation (1).    In general, which market interest rate that firms would refer to in 
choosing pension discount rates?  In financial accounting theory, the answer is not obvious 
yet.    Moreover, in Japan, the interest rate of various kinds is used as an index for a long-term 
interest rate in the field of empirical research.  In this paper, we chose the yield of the 
government bond for ten years that are traded most actively as the proxy for a market interest 
rate.  Data was hand-collected from Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly issued by          Page 12   
Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan. 
          The following ratios are used in this paper as the debt to equity ratio.    The numerator is 
three variables respectively, short-term debt (SL), long-term debt (not including pension 
liabilities) (LL), and the sum totals of SL and LL (TL).  The deflator is the “adjusted equity,” 
which we will explain later in more detail.  The numerator of profitability index is earnings 
(net income) computed as if there has been no pension expenses (ADJNI), EBIT computed as 
if there has been no pension expenses (ADJEBIT), and other earnings (OTHER), respectively.  
The deflator is the “adjusted equity.”    All variables other than OTHER are defined as positive 
value.  As  for  OTHER, profits and gains are defined as positive value and expenses and losses 
are defined as negative value.  Earnings on “as if” basis is computed in consideration of tax 
effect, assuming that an effective tax rate is 50%.  The “adjusted equity” here is the equity 
computed as if there has been no pension expenses in the year and the other comprehensive 
income has not been gained in the year.
6  In short, all independent variables are created, not 
by the numbers influenced by choice of discount rate, but by the numbers given at the time 
when firms chose their discount rates. 
          The descriptive statistics of each variable are summarized in Panel A of Table 4, and the 
correlation coefficients are summarized in Panel B.  Although the correlation between 
ADJEBIT and OTHER is high, since these are obtained by dividing net income linearly, we 
will put them together into regression.  However, cautions are required for the high 
correlation between the debts and OTHER.  The high correlation may be caused by the fact 
that interest payments are included in OTHER.   We should judge carefully whether the result 
is stable, since there is a doubt of multicolinearlity. 
 
3.5   ANALYSIS  RESULTS 
         The coefficients of the firm-years that reduced discount rates 0.5% or less are presented 
in Panel A1 of Table 5 and the coefficients of the firm-years that reduced discount rates more 
than 0.5% are presented in Panel A2. Both are estimated at the same time by logit regression.  
GBI in the table is the absolute level (%) of government bond yield at end-of-year, and  ∆ GBI 
is its change in the year. 
          As shown in Panels A1 and A2, the coefficient on  ∆ GBI is not statistically significant.   
It is hard to say that the firms reduced pension discount rates with following the decline of 
market interest rate in the year.  The hitting ratio (percentage of correct estimation) when the 
model predicting the state 1 is at most about 30%.    On the other hand, the coefficient on GBI 
                                                   
6   The “other comprehensive income” here is only the part of the “minimum pension liabilities”.  The holding 
gains and losses of securities (available for sale) and the foreign currency translation adjustment account are as it is.          Page 13   
is statistically significant at 1%, and the hitting ratio is about 79%.    It seems that the firms had 
chosen their discount rates in consideration of only market interest level, not the change in 
interest rate, especially in the cases where the discount rates were reduced more than 0.5% at 
once.  The result suggests that after the market interest rate had declined considerably, the 
firms reduced pension discount rates reluctantly.  Since the firms reacted the interest rate 
movement in the market neither mechanically nor timely, the hypothesis H1 is not supported. 
     When the debt to equity ratio together with ADJEBIT and OTHER is included in 
independent variables, since the correlation coefficients between the debt to equity ratio and 
OTHER were quite high, the regression result is quite unstable.  Although there are a few 
cases in which significant results were obtained ((7), (9) and (11) in Panel A1), in those cases, 
the sign of coefficients is contrary to predicted in hypothesis H2a. Generally, the hypothesis H2a 
is not supported.  The firms, when the debt to equity ratio was high, did not reduce their 
discount rates not to worsen leverage.  The firms might have reduced discount rates 
regardless of the debt to equity ratio.
7 
          In contrast, in many cases, the coefficients on the rate of return on equity are significant 
and the sign is the same as predicted in hypothesis H2b.  As for profitability, the predicted 
results are observed significantly at 5% ((4) and (6) in Panel A1).    When EBIT and others are 
separated, the significant results are obtained at 5% level ((7), (9), (10) and (11) in Panel A1).  
These results are supporting hypothesis H2b.   That is, while the firms did not reduce discount 
rates when the rate of return on equity was low, they had reduced discount rates when it was 
high.  These results indicate that firms had chosen pension discount rates, attaching greater 
importance to the rate of return on equity more than to the debt to equity ratio. 
          However, we can say that firms chose discount rates in consideration of the rate of return 
on equity only if we compare the firm-years where the discount rates were not reduced with 
the firm-years reduced 0.5% or less.  As shown in the column of Fitness, it seems that 
analysis by logit model was not necessarily successful.  Then, we assigned measure 1 to the 
firm-years where the discount rates were reduced and measure 0 to the firm-years not reduced, 
and we tried the logit regression once again.  The results (not reported here) did not differ 
from those in Panel A2 of Table 5.    The firm-years that have reduced discount rates more than 
0.5% at a stretch might be quite noisy samples. 
          Thus, we eliminated the firm-years that have reduced discount rates more than 0.5% and 
tried logit analysis again.  The result is Panel B of Table 5.  In order to concentrate on 
verification of hypothesis H2a and H2b, it shows only the results, choosing the level of market 
                                                   
7      Even if the pension liabilities at the end of the previous year was chosen as the independent variable, the result 
was unaffected.          Page 14   
interest rate as the independent variable.
8  First, it turns out that limitation of a sample has 
contributed to the rise of the fitness greatly.  Second, the results reject hypothesis H2a and 
supports hypothesis H2b here too.  In sum, the firms reduced pension discount rates, 
considering the rate of return on equity instead of the debt to equity ratio. 
     We can get from above results the answer to the issue on fundamental concept.  It 
seems an error to see that choosing a pension discount rate is an issue of valuing pension 
liabilities on the balance sheet from asset-liability view.  From the traditional matching 
concept or revenue-expensive view, choosing a pension discount rate is just the issue on 
income measurement, including the method of making the discount rate zero --- the method of 
allocation without discounting.    In fact, the firms had chosen the allocation pattern that could 
avoid a sharp decline of profitability through manipulating pension discount rates.    However, 
as mentioned earlier, by the research design in this paper, we cannot clarify the contents of 
motives why firms think profitability as important.  An investigation of economic incentives 
is the subject left behind to future research. 
 
4.    Evaluation in the Capital Market --- Part One: Book Value of Equity Model 
4.1    CONTROVERSIAL POINTS OF PRIOR STUDIES 
     In many prior studies, it has been often discussed whether pension liabilities on the 
balance sheet is negatively associated with firm value, assuming that the assets and liabilities 
on the balance sheet is the proxy for economic worth of capital stock of a firm.  We should 
check the controversial point that prior discussion holds, before explaining the model we test. 
     Suppose, the total amount of market value of common equity at the end of year t is 
t MVE , and the firm value (total worth of the invested projects in the firm) is  t V , and the total 
amount of market value of the debt  t D .  The relation among these three variables in the 
following equation is well known. 
 
      t t t MVE D V + =  (2) 
 
          In the prior research, it is assumed that the firm value  t V   can be expressed using assets 
value  t A   in accounting, and in the same manner, the aggregated market value of debt  t D  can 
be expressed using debt value  t L  in accounting.  Specifically, we can express exclusively 
each relation as follows. 
 
                                                   
8   The hitting ratio was about 35%, when the change in interest rate was chosen as an independent variable, and 
when the level of the interest rate was chosen as an independent variable, it was about 77%.          Page 15   
      t t A V β α + =  ( 0 > β ) (3) 
      t t L D β α ′ + ′ =  ( 0 > ′ β ) (4) 
 
If these equations (3) and (4) are substituted for equation (2), we can get the following 
equation. 
 
      t t t L A MVE β β α α ′ − + ′ − = ) (  (5) 
 
It has been investigated based on this equation (5) whether the coefficient on debt  t L  is 
negative.    In this way, if the coefficient on pension liabilities on accounting basis is negative, 
some researchers assume that investors would regard pension liabilities and other debts (legal 
obligations) in the same rank, and investors would negatively value pension liabilities on 
accounting basis for firm valuation. 
     However, the valuation models like as equations (3) and (4) are very questionable 
conceptually.  The first controversial point is here.  Suppose the following equations in the 
form that is more general. 
 
      t t t cL bA a V + + =  (3’) 
      t t t L c A b a D ′ + ′ + ′ =  (4’) 
 
If above two equations are true, then equation (5) should be transformed as follows. 
 
      t t t L c c A b b a a MVE ) ( ) ( ) ( ′ − + ′ − + ′ − =  (5’) 
 
At this time, there is nothing to be able to say beforehand with regard to the sign and size of 
coefficient on accounting debt  t L .  It is obvious that the hypothesis of (5') is so-called joint 
hypothesis of (3') and (4'). 
     Since the assets value in accounting generally is not equal to the capitalized worth of 
future cash flows, it is an error to assume that  1 = ′ − b b  in equation (5').  At the same time, 
since debt is not usually valued by fair values in financial accounting, it is also an error to 
assume that  1 − = ′ − c c .
9  Originally, income measurement is the main object in financial 
accounting; therefore, the amount of assets and liabilities is not necessarily determined based 
                                                   
9   However, when the great portion of assets and liabilities consist of the so-called financial instruments and the 
goodwill of a firm can be ignored statistically (for example, a part of financial industry), analysis by equation (5') 
may have some validity.          Page 16   
on economic worth statically.  Both assets and liabilities are just the dynamic results by 
income measurement, and investors would use the disclosed earnings information for firm 
valuation.  The model, which connects the assets and liabilities on the balance sheet to the 
firm value directly, does not have the conceptual and theoretical background based on the 
traditional paradigm, because it ignores the goodwill that is the source of future excess 
earnings. 
          Nevertheless, in the prior research, equation (5) is handled more intricately.    The assets 
and liabilities are usually divided into some blocks.    Here, we will divide into two parts, 1 and 
2, for convenience.    Then equation (5) is rewritten into the following equation (6). 
 
      () ( ) t t t t t L A L A MVE 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 ) ( β β β β α α ′ − + ′ − + ′ − =  (6) 
 
Suppose that in part 1, net debt  t NL1 ( 0 1 1 > − = t t A L ) is calculated on accounting basis, while 
net-assets  t NA2 ( 0 2 2 > − = t t L A ) is calculated on accounting basis in part 2.  The main 
purpose for condensing into net amount by each part is to avoid the problem of 
multicolinearlity in regression analysis.  By these arrangements, equation (6) is further 
transformed into the following strange equation (7). 
 
      t t t NA NL MVE 2 2 1 1 0 γ γ γ + + =  (7) 
 
Typically, pension liabilities on the balance sheet would be substituted for the net debt  t NL1 , 
the book value of other net-assets will be substituted for  t NA2 , then it has been tested whether 
the coefficient  1 γ   on pension liabilities is negative or not.
10 
     The second controversial point exists here and it is comparatively clear.  The question 
is how the projects in the firm can be divided linearly like equation (6).    Consider a firm has 
two investment projects; one is the financial investment (investment of free cash) and the other 
is  business investment.  Since two projects are independent (separable) mutually, when 
valuing the firm, what is necessary is just to evaluate two projects independently and to sum 
them simply.  However, the contribution to the pension fund and the investment in pension 
assets are, for a firm, not a pure financial investment.  Pension contributions and pension 
investments are connected with two or more business investments closely indivisible; thus, we 
cannot linearly divide into pension liabilities and other net-assets.  In addition, if net worth 
(present value) of a certain investment project is negative, there is primarily no economic 
                                                   
10      For example, Landsman [1986], Barth [1991], Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue [1993, 1995].          Page 17   
rationality to continue it.    Therefore, to assume that the coefficient on any project in equation 
(7) will be negative lacks economic rationality.  There remains a serious problem in 
discussing the obligation nature of pension liabilities on accounting basis by testing the sign of 
coefficients in equation (7).  It is important to note the linearity and economic rationality of 
the regression model. 
 
4.2  HYOPOTHESES  AND  MODEL 
     Many of prior studies have not necessarily placed enough weight on the economical 
meaning of above-mentioned traditional paradigm, but built regression models rather easily, 
and the prior studies have directed attention only to statistical interpretations of regression 
results.  If empirical analysis would be attempted without conceptual background, common 
work with theoretical and empirical study would not be attained.  From such a viewpoint, 
Ohlson [1995] model attracts great concern in recent years.  Ohlson divided the stream of 
accounting earnings into normal earnings and excess earnings, and he noticed especially that 
the former could be expressed as a function of the book value of equity.    Moreover, giving the 
proof that the cash flow discount model, the dividend discount model, and the excess earnings 
(residual income) discount model are equivalent, Ohlson formulated the firm valuation model 
using the book value of equity.
11 
          This paper builds a regression model by referring to the essence of Ohlson model.    First, 
we begin with the discount model of permanent earnings.  Permanent earnings is defined as 
the constant earnings that a firm could produce perpetually.  Below, we denote it as  p π .  It 
is assumed in the traditional paradigm that investors will predict permanent earnings from 
accounting information disclosed every year and evaluate common equity, discounting 
permanent earnings by the cost of capital r.    Thus, the following equation (8) can be assumed. 
 







=  (8) 
 
The cost of capital r is given and not the question here. 
     Second, we assume the relation between permanent earnings and the book value of 
Equity.  According to Ohlson, normal earnings is equal to the product of the book value of 
equity and the cost of capital.  If an assumption analogous to it is applied here, we can 
express permanent earnings as follows: 
                                                   
11      See Ohlson [1995], Feltham and Ohlson [1995], Penman [1998], Penman and Sugiannis [1998].          Page 18   
 
     
∗ ⋅ = BVE r E p t ) (π  (9) 
 
where 
∗ BVE  is the expected capital stock that could produce permanent earnings by annual 
rate r.  This capital stock 
∗ BVE  does not always agree with the actual book value of equity 
t BVE .    The actual book value of equity could be influenced by various accounting allocation 
methods of cash flows and managerial assumption and discretion.  Then a certain kind of 
noise is included in actual book value.  Therefore, when investors actually use accounting 
information, they would assume in the following form. 
 
      t bBVE a BVE + =
∗  (10) 
 
     Third, we formulate the regression model.  If above equation (10) is substituted for 
equation (9) and is further substituted for equation (8), the following equation (11) will be 
obtained. 
 
     
t t t bBVE a bBVE a r
r
MVE + = + ⋅ = ) (
1  (11) 
 
This equation (11) is the foundation of the model in this paper.  It is important to note that 
coefficient b on the book value of equity is independently determined from the size of the cost 
of capital r here.  Coefficient b implies the ratio of the capital stock, which is expected to 
produce permanent earnings, to the actual book value of equity.    Of course, in the state where 
a firm always produces earnings equal to the multiplied amount of the book value of equity by 
the cost of capital, neither the noise nor the deviation of book value exists and so the 
coefficient b will be one.  However, there is no guarantee that the regression coefficient will 
be one, actually.  The coefficient may exceeds one or not, so both cases cannot be logically 
denied either.
 12 
     Finally, we introduce the target variable related with pension accounting into equation 
(11).  Since unamortized pension obligations  t UPO  is potentially the adjusting item to the 
book value of equity, it can be included in equation (11).    Then, we can estimate the following 
regression model. 
 
                                                   
12      One of the reasons is because the goodwill exists in business investment of the firm and excess earnings will 
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      u UPO BVE MVE t t t + + + = 2 1 β β α  (12) 
 
It is important point that the linear relation assumption that  1 2 β β − =   is not rejected formally 
here as a calculation rule.    If all pension obligations were amortized at once, the book value of 
equity would decrease necessarily as much amount as  t UPO  additionally.  However, we do 
not suppose that a firm should amortize pension obligations quickly as soon as possible; 
because it is repeatedly confirmed in empirical studies that leveling-amortization (smoothing) 
is generally useful for investors to predict future cash flows.  Rather, on the assumption that 
t UPO  will not be amortized at once, this paper investigates the difference in the information 
contents between the book value of equity and unamortized pension obligations. 
     In this paper, while unamortized pension obligations is chosen as the independent 
variable, the total amounts of pension obligations, the underfoundings amount, and pension 
liabilities on the balance sheet are all not chosen as independent variables.    It is the distinctive 
point where this model differs from that of the prior study.  As mentioned above, the basic 
structure of accounting gives the basis for the linear combination in equation (12).  On the 
contrary, neither the total amount of pension obligations nor pension liabilities on the balance 
sheet can be included in independent variables of a linear regression model like equation (12).   
There is no necessity that it will be a linear model when they and the book value of equity are 
at the same time included in independent variables.  If they are the same as that of legal 
obligations, such as borrowing, it is still more so as explained earlier.    In this way, the greatest 
feature of our model is the point of including only unamortized pension obligations. 
     Next, let us consider the sign of coefficient  2 β  on unamortized pension obligations 
t UPO  in equation (12).  It is a wrong expectation that the sign will be negative only by the 
reason that the payments would occur in the future.    From the premise of our model, the sign 
would be determined depending on the relation between  t UPO  and permanent earnings.  
Originally, pension obligations has two aspects.  One is the unpaid wages for labor services 
consumed in the past, so this aspect has no relation with future permanent earnings.    Another 
is the incentive cost for buttonholing the competent employee to the firm and pulling out much 
more ability.  The latter is an investment in human resources that is usually off-balanced in 
financial accounting, and it will be reasonable to suppose that cash inflows will exceed the 
investment.  This aspect may have the meaningful relation with permanent earnings.  
Therefore, the coefficient  2 β   will be positive. 
 
     H 3a     When stock price is chosen as a dependent variable and the book value of equity 
and unamortized pension obligations are chosen as independent variables, the latter          Page 20   
coefficient will not be negative.      ( 0 2 ≥ β ) 
 
     Unamortized pension obligations can be divided into two elements.  The first element 
is the off-balanced obligations as follows. 
 
Off-balanced net obligations = Pension obligations (PBO)  ʵ  Fair value of pension assets 
ʵ  Pension liabilities on the balance sheet 
 
We denote these off-balanced net obligations as OFF hereafter. The second element is the 
unamortized obligations included in pension liabilities on the balance sheet.  Below, we 
denote this second element as MIN.
13  Furthermore, we divide this MIN into the part treated as 
a deduction item (other comprehensive income) from equity OCI, and the part treated as the 
intangible asset ITG.
14  In this Section, all of the variables of pension obligations are defined 
as positive variables. 
          We estimate the following regression model and expect the sign of coefficients as shown 
in parenthesis. 
 
















t + + + + =







β β β α    ( 0 , 0 , 0 3 2 1 ≥ ≥ > β β β ) (13) 
 
Here,  t P  is stock price at the end of year t.  In this paper, the stock price at the time of an 
official announcement of accounting information is not chosen as the dependent variable.  
Indeed, the stock price at the time of accounting information disclosed can be a candidate for a 
dependent variable.    However, when accounting information is officially announced in media, 
not only the accounting performance but also the dividend policy and the performance prospect 
by managers are released often at the same time.    Therefore, it is not easy to control the effect 
which information other than accounting performance has on stock prices, and how to choose 
the stock price at which time as a dependent variable is not conclusive theoretically.  Then, 
according to the convention in precedence study, this study also chooses the year-end stock 
price the dependent variable.
15    Besides, we collected stock price data from Nikkei NEEDS. 
                                                   
13      This is the on-balanced amount of the “minimum pension liabilities” forced by SFAS No.87.  This  compulsive 
regulation does not exist in Japanese accounting standard.   
14      Both part of the intangible assets as prior service costs and the deferred income taxes originated from OCI are 
included in ITG. 
15   Although it is not as sensitive a problem as the so-called event study, also in ERC study, the time of a stock 
price level and the selection of the calculation period (window) of a return, which are chosen as the dependent 
variable, are one point at issue.          Page 21   
     The next subject is the relation between pension discount rates and stock prices.  As 
confirmed in Section 3, though discount rates followed the decline of market interest rate, 
firms have chosen discount rates so that the fall of profitability (ROE) might be avoided.  
However, other things being equal, making unamortized pension obligations smaller only on 
appearance by using higher discount rates should lower the firm value.    If investors observed 
those behaviors, investors might suspect that the firm’s profitability would decline.    In such a 
case, investors would expect that the investment in human resources would produce smaller 
future cash flows.    Therefore, the following hypothesis can be assumed. 
 
     H 3b  When stock price is chosen as a dependent variable and the book value of equity 
and unamortized pension obligations are chosen as independent variables, the latter 
coefficient for the firms, whose pension discount rates are higher, is smaller. 
 
          When applying regression analysis, after correcting all variables to the number per share, 
we deflated all variables by stock price at the beginning of the year except for a constant term.   
The purpose of this deflation is for relieving the heteroscedasticity resulting from size.  Of 
course, although there is no necessity to choose deflator the stock price at the beginning of the 
year, the purpose of the choice is just to contrast with the earnings discount model, which we 
will explain in the next Section. 
 
4.3  ANALYSIS  RESULTS 
     The descriptive statistics of each variables (Panel A) and the correlation coefficients 
between variables (Panel B) are presented in Table 6.    Since the variables MIN, OCI, and ITG 
relevant to the “minimum pension liabilities” by SFAS No. 87 are produced only when pension 
discount rates are reduced and the underfoundings on accounting exceeds a threshold, those 
distributions are skewed and all have a large variance compared with a small mean.  In 
addition, since the correlation between OCI and ITG is very strong, if they are included in 
independent variables, the problem of multicolinearlity will occur.  However, since the 
information contents of OCI and ITG are not directly related to the main subject in this study, 
below this paper does not pry into the point any more. 
          The basic results by OLS regression analysis are shown in columns (1) to (5) of Table 7.   
These results show that no significant relation exists statistically between each unamortized 
pension obligations and stock prices.  However, as presented in columns (6), (7), and (8), 
when on-balanced pension obligations (pension liabilities) and off-balanced pension 
obligations are included in independent variables, the former coefficient is negative and the          Page 22   
latter is positive and all are significant at 5%.  However, since the correlation coefficients 
between on- and off-variables are over 0.5, the problem of multicolinearlity may have occurred.   
With regard to the robustness of regression results, the further investigation will be required.  
We will reexamine this point in Section 6. 
     The second subject here is to confirm how the regression coefficient on unamortized 
pension obligations reflects the size of pension discount rate, i.e. whether investors take the 
size of discount rate into consideration when evaluating the firms.  Then, we calculated the 
mean of pension discount rates of each firm in the sample period, and divided samples into two 
groups, the firms that chose higher discount rates above the median (N= 101), and the firms 
that chose lower discount rates below the median (N= 98).   The reason for dividing into firm 
groups is that a firm does not choose the pension discount rate independently every year, but a 
firm chooses the discount rate based on its history till then and a serial correlation between 
discount rates may exist.  If samples are divided by the size of pension discount rate, or the 
size of difference between the market interest rate and the discount rate, the bias of sample 
year will occur among subgroups.  In such a case, even if the gap between subgroups is 
detected, it is undistinguishable whether the size of pension discount rate or the bias of sample 
year is the cause of that gap. 
     The results of regression when dividing into two subgroups are summarized in Table 8. 
For example, (1H) is the result for the firm group that chose the higher discount rate, and (1L) 
is the result for the lower group.  When (1H) are compared with (1L), it turns out that no 
significant difference exists between subgroups in the information content of the book value of 
equity.  We can confirm this point from results by Chow Test in the rightmost column.  On 
the other hand, when unamortized pension obligations MIN, OCI, and OFF are included in 
independent variables, except for ITG, the coefficients are significantly positive for the firms 
choosing lower rates.  Especially, as for OFF, when it is included in independent variables 
with on-balanced unamortized pension obligations, the similar results are obtained consistently 
((6L), (7L), (8L)).  From these regression results, it seems that, investors would value 
unamortized pension obligations according to the size of pension discount rate of each firm. 
     In order to investigate above inference in more detail, the difference in coefficients on 
unamortized pension obligations between subgroups was verified through the slope dummy 
variable  MIN D  and so on, which are 1 for the higher rate group.  The results are shown in 
Table 9.  For example, the coefficient on MIN for the higher rate group is -0.3538=2.8313- 
3.1851 (see (1)).  Thereby, the significant difference in coefficients between subgroups 
becomes clear explicitly. 
     The results in Tables 7, 8, and 9 show that, when MIN and OCI are included in          Page 23   
independent variables respectively, only for the firm group of the lower discount rate, the 
coefficients are significantly positive and are not significant in other cases.  The coefficient 
on ITG is not significant.  In contrast, it turns out that the coefficient on OFF is positive 
significantly.  After all, hypothesis H3b is not rejected.  That is, the size of unamortized 
pension obligations may have the relation with positive expectation of permanent earnings or 
future cash flows.  These results are consistent with intuition: firms are valued higher in the 
capital market when they choose lower rates and when they reduce their discount rates earlier 
according to the fall of market interest rate. 
     Even then, regression results are significant only at the conventional level and t value 
(white's t) is not so high.    Test of robustness should be carried out again.    We will turn to this 
point in Section 6. 
 
5.    Evaluation in the Capital Market --- Part Two: Earnings Model 
5.1  HYPOTHESES  AND  MODEL 
          In prior studies, it is assumed usually that investors forecast permanent earnings  p π  by 
using earnings information rather than using the equity (net-assets) information.  That is, 
supposing that earnings in year t is  t π , we can express the following equation. 
 
      t p t b a E π π + = ) (  (14) 
 
The following equation can be obtained if equation (14) is substituted for equation (8). 
 





MVE π + =  (15) 
 
This is the basic equation for regression analysis below.  Unlike the case in the foregoing 
Section, the size of coefficients based on equation (15) depends not only on the relation 
between actual earnings each year and expected permanent earnings, but also on the size of the 
cost of capital.  Therefore, when comparing the coefficients between different equations, we 
should judge carefully which factor is producing the difference. 
          Here we will divide earnings into composition elements, noting 1 and 2 for convenience 
here.    The following famous regression model will be obtained.
16 
                                                   
16   The model here is similar to models in ERC (Earnings Response Coefficients) studies.  See, for example, 
Easton [1985], Kormendi and Lipe [1987], Collins and Kothari [1989], Easton and Zmijewski [1989], Easton and 
Harris [1991], Ari and Zarowin [1992a, b], Easton, Harris and Ohlson [1992], Ball, Kothari and Watts [1993],          Page 24   
 
      u MVE t t t + + + = 2 2 1 1 π β π β α    ( W h e r e   t t t 2 1 π π π + = ) (16) 
 
No problem may exist in dividing independent variables linearly into pension expenses 
PCOST and other earnings ADJNI.  In this paper, we chose deflator the stock price at the 
beginning of the year, and analyzed by the following regression. 
 












t + + + =





β β α  (17) 
 
     Now, the question is how to predict the sign and size of coefficient  2 β  on pension 
expenses here.    In general, since the ordinary element that occurs repeatedly and continuously 
differs in the size of coefficients (ERC: Earnings Response Coefficients) from the unordinary 
element that occurs rarely, it is natural to divide earnings into composition elements.  By the 
same logic, it is often assumed that the size of coefficient on positive earnings differs from that 
on negative earnings (losses).  However, it is not clear what difference exists in the 
persistence between pension expenses and other earnings elements.
17    That is, it is difficult to 
predict the size comparison between  1 β  and  2 β  from the viewpoint of the persistence of 
earnings.  Of course, it is out of question to expect that the coefficient will be negative by 
reason that it is expense.  Especially there is no theoretical foundation to assume that 
2 1 β β − = .  As explained in Section 4, the size and sign of coefficients will be determined by 
the relation between independent variables and expected permanent earnings, and are not 
determined by accounting treatment or position of the variable. 
     In our presumption, as long as the investment in human resources would produce 
positive cash flows in the future, the coefficient  2 β  would be positive.  The essence of 
contribution to the pension fund is, for a firm, not only the cost for already consumed labor 
service, but also the incentive cost that has an effect over an employee's whole service period 
until retirement.  The latter is the important factor that determines the sign and size of 
coefficient  2 β .    Therefore, the hypothesis in this chapter is as follows. 
 
     H 4a   When stock price is chosen as a dependent variable, and pension expenses and 
other composition elements of earnings are chosen as independent variables, the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Ramesh and Thiagarajan [1993], Kothari and Zimmerman [1995], Ramakrishnan and Thomas [1998]. 
17   As this kind of study, Barth and Beaver and Landsman [1992] is famous study.  However, the issue why 
coefficients (ERC) differ for every element of pension expenses is not sufficiently explained.          Page 25   
former coefficient will not  be  negative.   ( 0 2 ≥ β ) 
 
          Furthermore, in respect of the relation between the size of discount rate and stock prices, 
we investigate the following hypothesis like in Section 4. 
 
     H 4b   When stock price is chosen as a dependent variable, and pension expenses and 
other composition elements of earnings are chosen as independent variables, the 
former regression coefficient for the firms, whose pension discount rates are higher, 
is smaller. 
 
     In the rest of this paper, we will divide earnings into “earnings before interests and 
taxes” (EBIT) and other earnings OTHER, the amount added back pension expenses PCOST to 
EBIT is set to ADJEBIT.  The combinations of independent variables are two sets; (PCOST, 
ADJNI) and (PCOST, ADJEBIT and OTHER).  The pension expenses PCOST and OTHER 
are defined by positive values here.    It will be clarified by comparing the sign of PCOST and 
that of OTHER whether the coefficient on expense or loss would be negative.   Of course, we 
predict that the sign of coefficient on OTHER will be negative, since this OTHER implies 
unproductive cash outflows and it will also occur repeatedly in the future. 
 
5.2  ANALYSIS  RSULTS 
     The descriptive statistics of each variables and correlation coefficients are summarized 
in Table 10.    Although mean and median of PCOST are not so large compared with EBIT, but 
compared with earnings (net income; NI), PCOST are 50% (40%) or more of NI in mean 
(median).  However, the correlation coefficients between pension expenses and other 
composition elements of earnings are not so high level as earnings smoothing is assumed.    In 
addition, the standard deviation of pension expenses is very small compared with other 
variables.  The correlation coefficient between pension expenses and stock prices is low.  
According to these statistical facts, pension expenses may not have the information value that 
influences stock prices. 
     Table 11 provides basic results by regression analysis.  First, the coefficients on all 
variables other than pension expenses are the same sign as predicted, and are significant at 1%.   
However, the coefficient on pension expenses is not significant.    When samples are pooled, it 
seems that pension expenses do not have the information contents explaining the variation in 
stock prices.  Of course, this is the result when not dividing into calculation elements, i.e. 
pension expenses are handled in block.  In fact, pension expenses can be divided into          Page 26   
calculation elements, such as service cost and interest cost and so on.  However, it is not the 
subject in this study.  Anyway, from this regression result, it turns out that it is an error to 
assume in short circuit that the coefficient on expense will be negative. 
     Second, the relation between pension discount rates and stock prices was analyzed by 
the same procedure as in the foregoing Section.  The results are presented in Table 12.  The 
samples are divided into two groups, the firms that chose higher discount rates (N= 101), and 
the firms that chose lower discount rates (N= 98), here too.  The preparatory step is to check 
any structural difference between subgroups through the basic model in which pension 
expenses is not separated as an independent variable (Panel A).  This is for checking simply 
whether the difference in the cost of capital would produce a decisive difference in coefficients 
between subgroups.  According to Chow Test, there is no significant structural difference 
between two subgroups.  Therefore, we can neglect the possibility that the cost of capital 
would cause a difference in coefficients here. 
     Next step is to separate pension expenses as an independent variable.  A significant 
difference exists between two subgroups.  These results are shown in Panel B.  For the firm 
group of the lower rate, the coefficient on pension expenses is significantly positive at 1%.  
The difference between two groups can be analyzed by the slope dummy variable  PCOST D , 
which is 1 for the firms that chose higher rates (Panel C).  For the lower rate group, larger 
pension expenses is associated with expectation of larger future cash flows and therefore stock 
prices of those firms are so higher.  On the contrary, the size of pension expenses is not 
reflected in stock prices for the firms that chose higher rates. 
          These results suggest that the firms, which chose lower rates, are valued relatively higher 
in the capital market.  This interpretation is also consistent with results in Section 4.  In 
addition, when Tables 7, 8, and 9 and Tables 11 and 12 are compared in respect of adjusted R2, 
there is no large difference between the book value of equity model and the earnings model.  
In this scope, one model is not necessarily superior in explanatory power of variations in stock 
prices than another.  Here, we emphasize that both unamortized pension obligations and 
pension expenses has positive relation with stock prices for the firms choosing higher rates.  
This is the original discovery by this study. 
     However, as well as the foregoing Section, since t-value (white's t) of coefficient on 
pension expenses is not so large, we will check the robustness of results later in more detail.  
Moreover, above results do not mean that investors have received the information on 
distinctive nature between firms only from disclosed pension discount rates.  Rather, it is 
natural to think that investors can distinguish between firms by the knowledge from various 
information sources, and make them reflected in stock prices.  Probably, the size of discount          Page 27   
rate may be functioning as a proxy for distinction here. 
     Furthermore, the above-mentioned result does not justify the accounting standard that 
permits firms’ discretion in choosing pension discount rates.  In fact, as empirical results in 
this paper shows, even if a firm would manipulate pension expenses through adjusting the 
discount rate, investors could evaluate the firm considering the incentive of firms without 
being deceived.    However, while the market discipline functions, the variation in discount rate 
may remain without converging.  This indicates that some firms take the merit by using 
higher discount rates.    It is well known that, under such a situation, investors may over-value 
a firm and, in the counter part, some firms may receive the information rent.
18  In short, the 
noise is included in accounting information. 
          The problem will be formally solved at least, if the accounting standard prescribes that a 
firm cannot choose a discount rate discretionally.  However, there is no conclusive factor 
conceptually with regard to what should be the discount rate.  It may be a too much rude 
argument that what is necessary is just to eliminate discretion of a firm.  Primarily, the 
question is why discount calculation is required when allocating expenses to each year.  The 
relation between discounting and allocation should be reexamined.  It is not theoretically 
obvious whether the calculation method of pension expenses in present accounting standard is 
consistent with the traditional body of allocation.  The empirical results suggest the need for 
further investigation. 
 
6.  Robustness  of  Results 
6.1    THE DIFFERENCE MODEL 
     In this Section, we will check the robustness of results in Sections 4 and 5.  First, we 
will reexamine the book value of equity model and the earnings model by interchanging all of 
independent variables and dependent variables into the changes in the year (hereafter we call 
them the difference model).  It is sometimes pointed out that the noise of serial correlations 
included in panel data will be removed when applying a difference model.  In general, if the 
increase or decrease in the year would be forecasted in advance in the capital market, they may 
not be significant explaining variables.    In addition, the change in the variable is often seemed 
as the unexpected change by the well-known naïve expectation model.  Therefore, the 
regression analysis by the difference model will give a certain key, in guessing whether 
investors would react unexpected changes in variables used in Sections 4 and 5. 
          The book value of equity model using first difference variables is as follows. 
                                                   
18      For example, investors can distinguish only uncertainly the firm that has no intention of earnings management 
and accidentally uses the higher discount rate from the firm that manipulates earnings using the higher discount rate.          Page 28   
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∆  (18) 
 
     Table 13 is the results by this regression.  We divide pension obligations MIN 
corresponding to the “minimum pension liabilities” into two parts, OCI and ITG as defined in 
Section 4.  While the coefficient on pension obligations corresponding to the “minimum 
pension liabilities” is significantly positive at 1% for the firms that chose lower discount rates, 
the coefficient is not significant for the firms choosing higher rates.  The result provides the 
evidence that the firms, which chose lower rates, are valued higher.  On the other hand, the 
coefficient on off-balanced pension obligations OFF is not significant in both subgroups. 
          These asymmetric results can be interpreted as follows. In Section 4, so great noise may 
be included in variables that the significance level of coefficients on pension obligations 
corresponding to the “minimum pension liabilities” was low, because the amount of its 
obligations is generally determined by discretionary contribution policy of each firm.  In 
contrast, in the difference model, the noise may be removed.  On the other hand, as for 
variable OFF, its increase or decrease would be predicted in advance in the market.   The size 
of these off-balanced pension obligations is determined by amortization policy (smoothing 
policy) of pension obligations, the size of accumulated benefits obligations (ABO), the 
increasing rate of salary, etc.  Since the two latter factors are not changed so frequently, 
investors can forecast them in advance.    We will discuss this puzzle once again later. 
          Next, the difference model of earnings is applied. Regression equation is as follows. 
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∆  (19) 
 
Table 14 shows the results by regression analysis.  In this model too, the same results as in 
Section 5 are obtained.  For the firms choosing lower discount rates, the coefficient on 
changes in pension expenses is positive significantly at 5%.  That is, the stock price would 
rise so much when pension expenses would increase in the year.    On the other hand, the firms 
choosing higher rates are valued lower.  Although the significance level of the difference 
between two subgroups is not so high as about 10% level, we can say that the results in Section 
5 is robust. 
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6.2    INTEGRATED MODEL OF BOOK VALUE OF EQUITY AND EARNINGS 
     Since the year-end book value of equity includes earnings in the year, we can integrate 
the book value of the equity model in Section 4 and the earnings model in Section 5 into a 
single model.    A starting point is the following equation. 
 
      ε β α + + + = ) ( t t t NI ADJBVE MVE  (20) 
 
This equation (20) can be transformed into the following equation (21). 
 
      ε γ γ α ′ + + + = t t t NI ADJBVE MVE 2 1  (21) 
 
Here, ADJBVE is equal to the year-end book value of equity minus earnings in the year.  As 
compared with equation (21), it is clear that the restricted condition as 
2 1 γ γ =  is imposed on 
the regression by equation (20).    In general, it will be natural to conjecture that the memory of 
stock prices is different between for the previous year data and for current year data. 
          Then, in order to check the robustness of results in the foregoing Section, the regression 
analysis by the following equation (22) was estimated.
19 
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δ δ δ δ  (22) 
 
Pension expenses and pension obligations are respectively substituted for independent variable 
t X   in above equation (22).
20 
         Table 15 shows the correlation coefficients between variables.    Lower left numbers are 
the correlation coefficients between the variables used in regression analysis, i.e., the variables 
which are deflated by stock price at the beginning of the year.  Upper right numbers are the 
correlation coefficients between the raw values not deflated.  The correlation coefficients 
between the book value of equity and the variables of earnings (NI and ADJNI) and the 
correlation coefficient between the book value of equity and pension expenses are very high in 
                                                   
19   Though basing another model, Gopalakrishnan [1994] examined the post retirement benefits other than 
pension (SFAS No. 106) using the similar model to this. 
20      If a capital transaction is ignored, this model will be transformed to the following difference model. 




+ + + =
















This is the model in Easton and Harris [1991].  However, the strong correlation exists, between the amount of 
changes in the year and the level at the end of the year.    The correlation coefficients, NI, ADJNI, PCOST, MIN, and 
OFF respectively are, 0.6334, 0.6605, 0.6555, 0.855 and 0.4027.  Therefore, the above-mentioned model has the 
problem of multicolinearlity and is not applicable to our sample.          Page 30   
upper right.  From this result, in order to avoid the problem of multicolinearlity, deflating by 
stock price at the beginning of the year would be very effective.    Even so, when deflated, the 
coefficients between three variables PCOST,  MIN, and OFF are very high.  Then, those 
variables will be included in the independent variable one by one below. 
         The results of regression are summarized in Table 16.   First, the coefficient on pension 
expenses is not statistically significant.  However, when the slope dummy  PCOST D  that is 1 
for the firms choosing higher rates is included in independent variables, although at 10% level, 
the same result as in Section 5 is obtained.  The firms, which chose lower rates, are valued 
higher in the capital market.  Second, pension obligations corresponding to the “minimum 
pension liabilities” are positively associated with stock prices significantly at 10%.  With 
regard to the difference between subgroups in the size of pension discount rate, although the 
sign is the same as the result in Section 4, the coefficients on slope dummy are not statistically 
significant.  It seems that most part of the information contents of changes in PCOST and 
MIN may overlap that of the book value of equity and earnings, thus they have no peculiar 
contents. 
     Finally, it seems that off-balanced pension obligations OFF has the still more inherent 
information contents even if earnings information is given.  The coefficient is significant at 
5%, but there is no significant difference in coefficients between subgroups.  Taking the 
results in Section 4 into consideration, OFF may be a proxy for some fixed ability of a firm 
existing for a long time.    However, our analysis cannot show its substance concretely. 
 
6.3    ADDITION THE MARKET INTEREST RATE TO INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
          In this paper, the number of sample is limited, and we place weight on fundamental-link.   
Thus, the technique of including a control variable in independent variables is not adopted.  
Consequently, there may be a problem that other conditions are not sufficiently controlled.    In 
this Section, we will add the year-end market interest rate (or its change in the year) to the 
independent variable in each model.    The purpose is for checking the possibility that pension 
discount rates serve as a proxy for interest rate.    Since the pooled data is used, a serial change 
in interest rate may be an omitted variable, which explains variations or changes in stock 
prices. 
     It may be contradictory that while we consider changes in market interest rate, we 
assume that the cost of capital does not change and the coefficient on earnings (ERC) is 
fixed.
21  If the interest rate would change in the sample period, the effect that changes in 
                                                   
21   However, this problem will not occur if we do cross-section analysis.  That is, a model does not have a 
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market interest rate has on stock prices should be checked.    The following equation (23) may 
be appropriate, if we transform the earnings discount model into the linear regression equation 
and choose the interest rate the independent variable, denoting the market interest rate as GBI. 
 
      η γ β α + + + = t t t GBI NI P ln ln  (23) 
 
However, in equation (23), we cannot divide linearly net income NI into components.  Since 
this point was an obstacle when analyzing ERC, we did not add the market interest rate to the 
independent variables in Section 5.  Here, in order to concentrate on checking the robustness 
of analysis results, we will disregard the linearity of regression, and add the market interest rate 
to independent variables simply. 
     Table 17 shows the regression results.  The results of analysis, when added the interest 
rate to the earnings model, are summarized in Panel A.    On the other hand, Panel B shows the 
results when adding changes in interest rate to the difference model.  Although the 
significance level of coefficient on pension expenses declines a little, all of the sign are the 
same as predicted.  In respect of the coefficient on slope dummy for the firms, which chose 
higher discount rates, the sign is the same as the cases where the market interest rate is not 
included, although the significance level becomes lower.  In sum, the analysis results of 
coefficients on pension expenses and slope dummy of the firm group are so robust that are not 
influenced by whether the market interest rate is included in the independent variable or not.
22 
 
7.  Conclusions  and  Implications 
          The first subject in this paper is the firms’ motives to choose their pension discount rates.   
Although the firms’ discount rates followed the fall of market interest rate, the firms had 
reduced them after the market interest rate declined considerably: the firms reduced discount 
rates reluctantly.  By logit model we analyzed what the factors have imposed restrictions on 
the reduction of discount rate.    It seems that firms considered not the deterioration of the debt 
to equity ratio but the rate of return on equity (ROE).  The second subject is how the size of 
discount rate chosen by the firm is evaluated in the capital market.  For the firms, which 
chose lower pension discount rate than median, both unamortized pension obligations and 
pension expenses are positively associated with stock prices.  On the contrary, for the firm 
group choosing the higher rate, the coefficients do not differ significantly from zero, and the 
                                                   
22      Results here are the cases where the market interest rate is not deflated by stock price at the beginning of the 
year.  Besides, when the interest rate level is deflated, the interest rate was not a significant independent variable.  
In addition, in the difference model, when the change in interest rate is deflated, except that the significance level of 
coefficient on slope dummy fell a little, the result did not change dramatically.          Page 32   
firms are valued relatively lower in the capital market.  The asymmetric results concerning 
the size of discount rate are consistent with the motives for discount rate choice. 
     However, even if firms behave rationally and investors react rationally to it, it does not 
mean that there is no theoretical issue in measurement of pension expenses.  The allocation 
method using discount calculation cannot be drawn uniquely and deductively from cost 
allocation principle.  Nevertheless, the discount calculation, which is not obvious 
conceptually, has been introduced into income measurement, and the discretion is 
unnecessarily given to firms in choosing their pension discount rates.  After all, the 
unnecessary noise is brought into earnings information by present accounting standards. From 
the viewpoint of income measurement, we should reexamine the validity of discount 
calculation. 
     Furthermore, we should reexamine the validity of on-balancing the “minimum pension 
liabilities” peculiar in the U.S. accounting standard, and the validity of classifying its part into 
“other comprehensive income” and deducting from equity.  If pension expenses is caught as 
the incentive cost during employee's whole service --- an investment in human resources for 
pulling out employee's much more will to work ---, it would be clear that pension expenses is 
not the expenditure which will not produce cash inflows in the future.  It is an important 
question whether pension liabilities on the balance sheet is the same as the unpaid expenses.  
We should emphasize that pension liabilities on the balance sheet is just the results of 
allocation based on the various fictions in financial accounting. 
     The main purpose in this paper is to investigate positively the subject pointed in 
theoretical study, thinking a fundamental relation as important.  As long as we attained this 
purpose, the restricted sample was sufficient.  Of course, the problem on statistical accuracy 
and the persuasive power of empirical results are left behind, and the justice of the result itself 
should wait for verification by large sample in the future.    Although there is such a limit, this 
study has given much suggestion at present to conceptual and theoretical study of pension 
expense measurement. 
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Table 1    Discount Rate and Interest Rate(%) 
Panel A  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  ç
  5 . 0               ç
 5.5                1        ç
  6.0         1  4   3  2  ç
 6.5    1  3  3  2  2  7  15  4  10  5  ç
  7.0  7 2 7 8 6  12  21  179  24  188  67  ç
 7.5  25  18  13  25  16  25  34  163  61  155  256  ç
  8.0  103 81 74 96 88  117  165 64  168 75  113  ç
 8.5  62  113  118  137  137  182  165  32  187  30  10  ç
  9.0  61 134 167 152 154 107  75  15  27  5    ç
 9.5  13  61  73  44  54  23  7    1      ç
10.0  11 25 31 12 17  4  2          ç
10.5    4  2  1      1          ç
11.0  1  1  1          ç
11.5        1  1  1            ç
  NA.  2    12 9 8 8 4 4 5 5 7  ç
Total 285 440 501 488 483 481 482 477 477 471 460  ç
Panel B        1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996   
CM10                         
Jan.  9.19  7.08  8.67  9.09  8.21  8.09  7.03  6.60  5.75  7.78  5.65   
Feb.  8.70  7.25  8.21  9.17  8.47  7.85  7.34  6.26  5.97  7.47  5.81   
Mar.  7.78 7.25 8.37 9.36 8.59 8.11 7.54 5.98 6.48 7.20 6.27   
Apr.  7.30  8.02  8.72  9.18  8.79  8.04  7.48  5.97  6.97  7.06  6.51   
May  7.71 8.61 9.09 8.86 8.76 8.07 7.39 6.04 7.18 6.63 6.74   
Jun  7.80  8.40  8.92  8.28  8.48  8.28  7.26  5.96  7.10  6.17  6.91   
July  7.30 8.45 9.06 8.02 8.47 8.27 6.84 5.81 7.30 6.28 6.87   
Aug.  7.17  8.76  9.26  8.11  8.75  7.90  6.59  5.68  7.24  6.49  6.64   
Sep.  7.45 9.42 8.98 8.19 8.89 7.65 6.42 5.36 7.46 6.20 6.83   
Oct.  7.43  9.52  8.80  8.01  8.72  7.53  6.59  5.33  7.74  6.04  6.53   
Nov.  7.25 8.86 8.96 7.87 8.39 7.42 6.87 5.72 7.96 5.93 6.20   
Dec.  7.11  8.99  9.11  7.84  8.08  7.09  6.77  5.77  7.81  5.71  6.30   
Ave. 7.68 8.38 8.85 8.50 8.55 7.86 7.01 5.87 7.08 6.58 6.44   
CM30                         
Jan.  9.40  7.39  8.83  8.93  8.26  8.27  7.58  7.34  6.29  7.85  6.05   
Feb.  8.93  7.54  8.43  9.01  8.50  8.03  7.85  7.09  6.49  7.61  6.24   
Mar.  7.96 7.55 8.63 9.17 8.56 8.29 7.97 6.82 6.91 7.45 6.60   
Apr.  7.39  8.25  8.95  9.03  8.76  8.21  7.96  6.85  7.27  7.36  6.79   
May  7.52 8.78 9.23 8.83 8.73 8.27 7.89 6.92 7.41 6.95 6.93   
Jun  7.57  8.57  9.00  8.27  8.46  8.47  7.84  6.81  7.40  6.57  7.06   
July  7.27 8.64 9.14 8.08 8.50 8.45 7.60 6.63 7.58 6.72 7.03   
Aug.  7.33  8.97  9.32  8.12  8.86  8.14  7.39  6.32  7.49  6.86  6.84   
Sep.  7.62 9.59 9.06 8.15 9.03 7.95 7.34 6.00 7.71 6.55 7.03   
Oct.  7.70  9.61  8.89  8.00  8.86  7.93  7.53  5.94  7.94  6.37  6.81   
Nov.  7.52 8.95 9.02 7.90 8.54 7.92 7.61 6.21 8.08 6.26 6.48   
Dec.  7.37  9.12  9.01  7.90  8.24  7.70  7.44  6.25  7.87  6.06  6.55   
Ave. 7.80 8.58 8.96 8.45 8.61 8.14 7.67 6.60 7.37 6.88 6.70   
AAA  9.01 9.39 9.71 9.26 9.32 8.77 8.14 7.21 7.97 7.59 7.37   
AUTL  9.58 9.98  10.20 9.78  10.02 9.32 8.51 7.45 8.30 7.85 7.77            Page 34   
Table 1    Table 1    Table 1    Table 1    (continued)       
Panel C  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996   
R a t e   1                
Jan.     7.30 7.21 6.32 6.59 6.16 5.95 5.00 6.30 4.85   
Feb.      7.06  7.14  6.61  6.62  6.06  5.87  5.03  6.28  4.84   
Mar.     6.74 7.21 6.80 6.42 6.28 5.67 5.19 6.09 4.99   
Apr.      6.90  7.34  6.85  6.63  6.38  5.46  5.53  5.96  5.28   
May     7.16 7.22 7.01 6.57 6.37 5.48 5.82 5.89 5.43   
Jun      7.38  7.06  6.98  6.62  6.31  5.54  5.93  5.56  5.54   
July     7.20 6.62 6.77 6.78 6.27 5.45 5.92 5.26 5.65   
Aug.      7.31  6.46  6.8  6.76  6.08  5.30  6.06  5.38  5.62   
Sep.     7.46 6.50 7.09 6.51 5.91 5.06 5.99 5.49 5.47   
Oct.      7.25  6.52  7.22  6.36  5.87  4.80  6.17  5.24  5.62   
Nov.     7.11 6.40 7.09 6.34 6.02 4.75 6.35 5.10 5.45   
Dec.      7.22  6.32  6.83  6.34  6.09  4.97  6.46  5.01  5.18   
Ave.     7.17 6.83 6.86 6.55 6.15 5.36 5.79 5.63 5.33   
R a t e   2                
1Q  9.50 7.50 8.75  10.50  10.50  10.00 7.50 6.00 6.00 8.50 8.75   
2Q  9.00  7.50  8.50  11.50  10.00  9.00  6.50  6.00  6.00  9.00  8.25   
3Q  8.50 8.25 9.00  11.00  10.00 8.50 6.50 6.00 7.25 9.00 8.25   
4Q  7.50  8.75  10.00  10.50  10.00  8.00  6.00  6.00  7.75  8.75  8.25   
Ave. 8.63 8.00 9.06  10.88  10.13 8.88 6.63 6.00 6.75 8.81 8.38   
Panel A; Assumed Discount Rate (Source: Accounting Trends and Techniques, AICPA) 
Panel B: Monthly Treasury Constant Maturity Rates, CM10 = 10 Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, CM30=30 
Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, AAA = Moodys Seasoned AAA, AUTIL = A-Utility, estimate of the yield 
on a recently offered (A-Rated utility bond with a maturity of 30 years and call protection of 5 years). All “Ave.” is 
that of calendar year. (Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago) 
Panel C: Rate 1 = Interest Rates for Valuing Vested Benefits for PBGC’s Variable Rate Premium, Rate 2 = Interest 
rates for Under- and Overpayments of Multiemployer Plan Withdrawal Liability (Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation) 
 
Table 2    Distributions of Discount Rate in Japan 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  ç
  2.5-           1  ç
 3.0-                1  7  ç
  3.5-         2  9  11  ç
 4.0-            4  8  7  1  ç
  4.5-       1 1  10  10 4 1  ç
 5.0-      1  1  4  3        ç
  5.5-  11 14 16 16 14  2        ç
 6.0-  2  4  2  1  1          ç
  6.5-    1         ç
 7.0-  2                  ç
Total 15 19 19 19 20 19 20 21 21  ç
GBI(%)  6.610 5.320 4.210 3.900 3.595 3.110 2.265 1.580 1.598  ç
This table consists of the only restricted samples that adopt SEC rules and whose fiscal year ends on March 31
st. 
GBI = Interest rate of government bond (10 years).          Page 35   
Table 3    Comparison of Basic Financial Ratios   
  Panel A  Previous Year  Changed Year 





  I  Liabilities             
(1)    Long Term liabilities 
           /   E q u i t y  








(3)   On-balanced  Pension 
  Obligation  /  Equity 




(4)   Off-balanced  Pension 
  Obligation  /  Equity 




  II  Earnings          
















  III  Cash  Flows          
(9)   Operating  cash  flows/ 
Equity in the previous year 




(10)    Investing cash flows/ 
Equity in the previous year 




z score is the Wilcoxon’s signed rank sum test statistics. All tests are two-tailed.          Page 36   
Table 3  ( continued) 









  I  Liabilities          
(1)    Long Term liabilities 
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(3)   On-balanced  Pension 
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(4)   Off-balanced  Pension 
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  III  Cash  Flows         
(9)   Operating  cash  flows/ 
Equity in the previous year 




(10)    Investing cash flows/ 
Equity in the previous year 




z score is the Mann-Whitney’s U-test statistics. All tests are two-tailed. 
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Table 4    Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 Panel A  GBI  ∆ GBI  SL LL TL  ADJNI  ADJEBIT  OTHER   
  Mean   3.5026  -0.6373   2.2308   1.1182   3.3491   0.0532   0.2328  -0.1796   
 St.  Dev.   1.5215   0.5172   2.9691   1.5699   4.4715   0.0560   0.1853   0.1854  
 Max    6.6100   1.5450 13.4480   8.4688 18.4994   0.1870   1.2192 -0.0043   
 Median   3.5950  -0.6850   1.2232   0.4900   1.6793   0.0580   0.1771  -0.1203   
  Min   1.5800  -2.0250   0.1408   0.0047   0.1830  -0.3020  -0.0964  -1.1445   
 Panel B  GBI  ∆ GBI  SL LL TL  ADJNI  ADJEBIT  OTHER   
  GBI    1.0000           
  △GBI  -0.3345    1.0000          
  SL   0.0847   0.0201   1.0000             
  LL  -0.0039   0.1076   0.9347   1.0000           
  TL   0.0549  -0.0247   0.9922   0.9718   1.0000         
  ADJNI   0.1160  -0.1111 -0.3155 -0.4016 -0.3505   1.0000       
  ADJEBIT   0.3058  -0.1687   0.8129   0.6931   0.7831   0.1501   1.0000     
  OTHER  -0.2707   0.1350 -0.9080 -0.8143 -0.8888   0.1521 -0.9543  1.0000   
GBI = Interest Rate of government bond(%), ˚GBI = GBIt – GBIt-1 SL = Short term liabilities, LL = Long term 
liabilities (other than Pension Liabilities), TL = SL + LL, ADJNI = Periodic Pension Cost + Net Income, EBIT = 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes, ADJEBIT = Pension Cost + EBIT, OTHER = NI – EBIT, All variables (other than 
GBI) are deflated by the end-of-year equity. 
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Table 5    Results of Logit Regression 
Panel A1            




























   9.073 
(3.937) 
[0.047] 









































































































   1.562 
(15.006) 
[0.000] 




































    0.544 
(9.675) 
[0.002] 















   0.026 
(0.022) 
[0.883] 
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Table 5  ( continued) 
Panel A2           







































































  -0.626 
(10.762) 
[0.001] 






   






  0.073 
(0.143) 
[0.705] 



























   0.524 
(2.474) 
[0.116] 
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Table 5  ( continued) 










   9.562 
(5.000) 
[0.025] 























































































All independent variables are deflated by the equity of the end of the year (see the note of Table 3). 
Panel A1 and A2 are the results when samples are divided into three groups and coded 0, 1, 2. 
0: Not changed discount rate.(N=121) 
1: Changed discount rate downward 0.5 % or less.(N=52) 
2: Changed discount rate downward more than 0.5 %.(N=26) 
In Panel A1, dependent variable is Log[P(1)/P(0)], and in Panel A2 dependent variable is Log[P(2)/P(0)]. 
Top = Estimated Coefficients, Middle = Chi-square, Bottom = p-value. 
In the column of Fitness, Top = R2, Middle = Chi-square, Bottom = p-value. 
Panel B is the results when samples coded 2 are excluded. The dependent variable is Log[P(1)/P(0)]. 
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Table 6    Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 Panel A  PRICE BVE  MIN  OCI  ITG  OFF   
  Mean  1.0108 0.6069 0.0201 0.0075    0.0127    0.0289   
  St. Dev.  0.2543 0.1735 0.0467 0.0193    0.0281    0.0307   
  Max  1.8715  1.1060  0.5001  0.2011   0.2990   0.2173   
  Median  0.9690 0.5950 0.0015 0.0000    0.0005    0.0190   
  Min  0.5036 0.2454 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0092  -0.0190   
  Panel B  PRICE BVE  MIN  OCI  ITG  OFF   
  PRICE  1.0000         
  BVE  0.4059  1.0000        
  MIN  0.0068 0.1301 1.0000        
  OCI  0.0038 0.1516 0.9812 1.0000      
  ITG  0.0088 0.1126 0.9912 0.9471 1.0000    
  OFF  0.1751 0.1545 0.5426 0.5150 0.5497 1.0000   
MIN = Minimum Pension Liability, OCI = Other Comprehensive Income (only for Pension liability Adjustment), 
ITG = Intangible Assets and Deferred Tax Assets = MIN – ITG,  OFF = Off-balanced Projected Pension 
Obligation (PBO), BVE = Equity (Net Assets) + OCI +(1-effective tax rate)*Periodic Pension Cost, Effective tax 
rate = 0.5. All variables are deflated by the beginning-of-year stock price. 
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Table 7    Results of OLS Regression: Book Value of Equity Model 























































































MIN = Minimum Pension Liability, OCI = Other Comprehensive Income (only for Pension liability Adjustment), 
ITG = Intangible Assets and Deferred Tax Assets = MIN – ITG, OFF = Off-balanced Projected Pension Obligation 
(PBO), BVE = Equity (Net Assets) + OCI +(1-effective tax rate)*Periodic Pension Cost, Effective tax rate = 0.5, 
DRATE = Discount Rate used in calculating PBO. All variables are deflated by the stock price at the beginning of 
the year. Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
(white-t), [Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed).          Page 43   
Table 8    Comparison: Higher Rate Group vs. Lower Rate Group (1) 


































































   -0.3972 
(-0.650) 
[0.517] 







   4.8118 
(1.807) 
[0.074] 


















    2.6540 
(2.522) 
[0.013] 
























   2.1750 
(2.177) 
[0.032] 






















































0.2457  F=1.863 
p=0.118 
Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (white-t), 
[Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed).          Page 44   
Table 9    Comparison: Higher Rate Group vs. Lower Rate Group (2) 














































































































Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (white-t), 
[Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed). 
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Table 10    Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 Panel A  PRICE NI  EBIT  PCOST  ADJNI  ADJEBIT  OTHER   
  Mean  1.0108   0.0225   0.1169  0.0151   0.0376   0.1320   0.0943   
  St. Dev.  0.2543   0.0326   0.0995  0.0135   0.0308   0.0982   0.1012   
  Max  1.8715   0.0974   0.5643  0.1198   0.1210   0.5696   0.5316   
  Median  0.9690   0.0274   0.0887  0.0118   0.0393   0.1061   0.0609   
  Min  0.5036 -0.2245 -0.0766 0.0008 -0.1959 -0.0419 -0.0041   
  Panel B  PRICE NI  EBIT  PCOST  ADJNI  ADJEBIT  OTHER   
  PRICE    1.0000          
  NI   0.2684   1.0000             
  EBIT   0.2083   0.6962   1.0000           
  PCOST    0.1086 -0.2908 -0.1810   1.0000         
  ADJNI   0.3135   0.9569   0.6727  -0.0005   1.0000       
  ADJEBIT   0.2413   0.6228   0.9611   0.0978   0.6806   1.0000     
  OTHER  -0.0633 -0.3403   0.4381   0.1271 -0.3171   0.4791 1.0000   
PCOST = Periodic pension Cost, NI = Net Income, ADJNI = PCOST + NI, EBIT = Earnings Before Interest and 
Taxes,  ADJEBIT = PCOST + EBIT, OTHER = NI – EBIT, All variables are deflated by the stock price at the 
beginning of the year 
 
 
Table 11    Results of OLS Regression: Earnings Model 




  2.4502 
(4.681) 
[0.000] 



































Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (white-t), 
[Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed).          Page 46   
Table 12    Comparison: Higher Rate Group vs. Lower Rate Group (3) 




  1.9062 
(3.311) 
[0.001] 




























0.0989  F=0.811 
p=0.489 















































0.2166  F=2.597 
p=0.038 






























PCOST = Pension cost, NI = Net Income, ADJNI = PCOST + NI, EBIT = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes, 
ADJEBIT = PCOST + EBIT, OTHER = NI – EBIT, All variables are deflated by the stock price at the beginning of 
the year. Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
(white-t), [Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed). 
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Table 13    First Difference Model: Book Value of Equity 














































































































Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (white-t), 
[Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed). 
 
Table  14  First  Difference  Model:  Earnings 






























Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (white-t), 
[Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed). 
 
Table 15    Correlation Matrix 
    PRICE BVE  NI  ADJNI  PCOST MIN OFF 
  PRICE    0.9217 0.7440 0.8004 0.7229 0.3281  0.5363 
  BVE  0.4059    0.6705 0.7291 0.7023 0.2378  0.4944 
  NI  0.3139 -0.0537    0.9890 0.4477 0.3070 0.4274 
  ADJNI  0.3835   0.0520   0.9105    0.5753  0.3605  0.5214 
  PCOST  0.1186    0.2479 -0.3322   0.0875    0.4807 0.7874 
  MIN  0.0068   0.1301 -0.3800 -0.0912 0.7073    0.4989 
  OFF  0.1751   0.1545  -0.1082   0.2511  0.8834  0.5426   
Numbers in lower left angle are correlation coefficients when all variables are deflated by the beginning-of-year stock price.          Page 48   
Table 16    Book Value of Equity and Earnings 


















































    0.5132 
(1.486) 
[0.139] 














































Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (white-t), 
[Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed). 
 
Table 17    Addition of Independent Variable 








































































Top = Estimated Coefficients, (Middle) = t-value using heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (white-t), 
[Bottom] = p-value (two-tailed). 
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